“Philip Condit and the Boeing 777

The case study Philip Condit and the Boeing 777 From Design and Development to end product and Sales deals with the launch and development key points of the Boeing 777 baffle in the 90s.Generally, the aircraft application is described as a very risky one as failure is the norm due to high product development costs. muchover it consists of a rival duopoly of the survival kilobyte makers Boeing and Airbus.The Boeing companys memorial of producing jets can be pause into 2 eras. In the 1920s, 1930s and during Worlds contend II., it was a military contractor producing bombers and fight aircraft. Later on, in the 1950, Boeing became the mankind s largest manufacturer of commercial aircraft. Their first jet was the 707 form. Although Boeing was very successful, Airbus remained a serious rival.In 1988, Boeing planned to upgrade the 767 model in drift to meet the level of Airbus competition which launched two new models. As Boeing had no 300-seat jetlines, nor plans to develop su ch a jet, the Executive Vice President Philip Condit proposed to human body a 767 motorcoach jet. To explore the risks, he tried to find disclose if the customers were interested in such a launch. But coupled Airlines jilted the idea of a 767 four-in-hand, as it had no chance against Airbus new model transports. Instead, Condit was won over to develop a completely new commercial Boeing jet which would be called the 777 project.One of the main characteristics of the Boeing 777 jet was that it was a consumer operate product. In order to decrease the risk of developing the new jet, Boeing canonical the project only until it obtained 68 firm orders of the 777 jet by the carrier wave United Airlines. Only then Boeing commited to the 777 program and the directors approved the close cooperation of the two companies. For the design and development phase Boeing hold ind the Working Together with eight more carriers.Furthermore Boeing 777 was a globally manufactured product, for whi ch 12 international companies were contracted.Boeing split the risk of the new product on a family of planes consisting of different planes manikin just about a basic 777 model. By that, the design included a maximum flexibility for future changes of the model according to customer preferences. too these facts, the 777 project delivered the first jetliner designed entirely by computers. Instead of unfashionable two-dimensional methods, the sophisticated computer program Catia (computer aided three-dimensional interactional application) had been used. Furthermore, all team members were connected according to Catia, which made them be cross-functional.During the 777 project, Boeing employ a new company culture, where assembly line workers were empowered and advance to offer suggestions and participate in the desicion making. Managers also payed attention to problems faced by their workers, such as safety concerns, childcare, etc.The Leadership and Management carriage changed fr om a secretive one to open communication among employees from an individualistic genius to teamwork.In the 1990 the new 777 aircraft program had been launched and in 1995 the first jet had been delivered, part in 2001 the 777s were flying in the service of major U.S. and international airlines. Although Boeing produced the nigh successful commercial jetliner, it was a risky project and its process contained undecided problems.Problem statementThe main concern of Boeing was its insufficiency to reach the agonistical level of its only rival, Airbus. While Boeing had no plans to even develop a 300-seat jetline, Airbus had launched in 1988 two new successful models. Condits pro thought of a modernization of the already existing 767 model by upgrading it to a double-decker jet, had been refused by United Airlines. Uniteds contra argument was that a Boeing 767 double-decker was no match to Airbuss new model transports.Boeings challenge was to create a completely new commercial jet m odel which should not only be the preferred airplane in the aircraft industry, still at the same time be launched at a warring price. The most costly and risky part of the development of an aircraft was the merchandise of the jet engine. Its production could cost as much as producing the airplane itself. By deciding to develop a completely new 777 model instead of updating the older 767 model, a new engine had to be developed. Although Boeing had been healthful in the 90s, the project still was risky. A failure of the costful new jetliner readiness have led to a decline of the Boeing company.The question was how to develop proficient and managerial innovations to cut costs. Those innovations in aircraft design, manufacturing and assembly were supposed to update Boeings engineering production outline and manufacturing strategies. The case focuses on efforts done to perish in the aircraft market by modernization, success and cost effectiveness. All efforts in the end run to the question, if Boeing will achieve a better combative position to Airbus.Data analysisThe main problem of the company arouse because its latest, eight-year-old, wide-body twin jet 767 Boeing model, even if upgraded and turned into a double-decker, still couldnt be a match to Airbuss new 300-seat wide-body models (the two engine A330 and the four engine A340). If Boeing wanted to have future on the market, it quickly had to resolve this retire by planning a flair of enhancing its competitive position relative to Airbus.Boeing was also being urged by the United Airlines and also by other airline carriers to develop a grunge new commercial jet, which was even expected to be the most modern airplane of its generation.The finding to be made in terms of this issue lies in the responsibility of Frank Shrontz, Boeings CEO, in 1988. The stakeholders to be upgrade affected by it were the future customers of the 777 Boeing model airline carriers from all around the world, like United Airlines. Also relevant to the outcome of Shrontzs decision were the manager Philip Condit, put in charge for the 777 project, as well as all the others 10 000 employees and lower level managers, that were recruited to work on it. The slur was going to affect as well Boeings suppliers for structural components, systems and equipment, which were 12 international companies located in ten countries.As first fasten for resolving the issue we can note that Boeings production system and manufacturing strategies were outmoded and pauperismed to be updated. In order to create an aircraft, which could argue with Airbuss latest ones, Boeing first needed to revitalize their mass production manufacturing system. Airbus also was ahead of Boeing because of their use of the most advanced technologies, and therefore Boeing had to introduce leading edge technologies into its jetliners.If we look at Exhibit II in the business case, we will see the market fortune of shipments of commercial aircr aft of Boeing, McDonnell Douglas (MD) (until 1997, in front the merger with Boeing) and Airbus, for the period 1992 2000. The percentage numbers on the table repoint the competitive relationship between Boeing and Airbus, especially when they remain the only players in the industry in 1997. Airbus is steadily raising the percentage of its market share of shipment throughout the years, for Boeings misfortune respectively. From here we can carry more our understanding of the threat that Boeing had in the face of Airbus and also of the need for the CEO of Boeing to come up with a solution for how to strengthen its competitive position.